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Abstract—In a noncooperative dynamic game, multiple agents
operating in a changing environment aim to optimize their
utilities over an infinite time horizon. Time-varying environments
allow to model more realistic scenarios (e.g., mobile devices
equipped with batteries, wireless communications over a fading
channel, etc.). However, solving a dynamic game is a difficult
task that requires dealing with multiple coupled optimal control
problems. We focus our analysis on a class of problems, named
dynamic potential games, whose solution can be found through
a single multivariate optimal control problem. Our analysis
generalizes previous studies by considering that the set of envi-
ronment’s states and the set of players’ actions are constrained,
as it is required by most of the applications. We also show that
the theoretical results are the natural extension of the analysis
for static potential games. We apply the analysis and provide
numerical methods to solve four key example problems, with
different features each: i) energy demand control in a smart-
grid network, ii) network flow optimization in which the relays
have bounded link capacity and limited battery life, iii) uplink
multiple access communication with users that have to optimize
the use of their batteries, and iv) two optimal scheduling games
with nonstationary channels.
Index Terms—Dynamic games, dynamic programming, game
theory, multiple access, network flow, optimal control, resource
allocation, scheduling, smart grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
GAME theory is a field of mathematics that studies con-flict and cooperation between intelligent decision makers
[1]. It has become a useful tool for modeling communication
and networking problems, such as power control and resource
sharing (see, e.g., [2]), wherein the strategies followed by
the users (i.e., players) influence each other, and the actions
have to be taken in a decentralized manner. However, one
main assumption of classic game theory is that the users
operate in a static environment, which is not influenced
by the players’ actions. This assumption is unrealistic in
many communication and networking problems. For instance,
wireless devices have to maximize throughput while facing
time-varying fading channels, and mobile devices may have
to control their transmitter power while saving their battery
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level. These time-varying scenarios can be better modeled by
dynamic games.
In a noncooperative dynamic game, the players compete in
a time-varying environment, which we assume can be char-
acterized by a deterministic discrete-time dynamical system
equipped with a set of states and a Markovian state-transition
equation. Each player has its utility function, which depends
on the current state of the system and the players’ current
actions. Both the state and action sets are subject to constraints.
Since the state-transitions induce a notion of time-evolution
in the game, we consider the general case wherein utilities,
state-transition function and constraints can be nonstationary.
A dynamic game starts at an initial state. Then, the players
take some action, based on the current state of the game, and
receive some utility values. Then, the game moves to another
state. This sequence of state-transitions is repeated at every
time step over a (possibly) infinite time horizon. We consider
the case in which the aim of each player is to find the sequence
of actions that maximizes its long term cumulative utility,
given other players’ sequence of actions. Thus, a game can
be represented as a set of coupled optimal-control-problems
(OCP), which are difficult to solve in general. Fortunately,
there is a class of dynamic games, named dynamic potential
games (DPG), that can be solved through a single multivariate-
optimal-control-problem (MOCP). The benefit of DPG is that
solving a single MOCP is generally simpler than solving a set
of coupled OCP (see [3] for a recent survey on DPG).
The pioneering work in the field of DPG is that of [4],
later extended by [5] and [6]. There have been two main
approaches to study DPG: the Euler-Lagrange equations and
the Pontryagin’s maximum (or minimum) principle. Recent
analysis by [3] and [7] used the Euler-Lagrange with DPG
in its reduced form, that is when it is possible to isolate the
action from the state-transition equation, so that the action is
expressed as a function of the current and future (i.e., after
transition) states. Consider, for example, that the future state
is linear in the current action; then, it is easy to invert the
state-transition function and rewrite the problem in reduced
form, with the action expressed as a function of the current
and future states. However, in many cases, it is not possible to
find such reduced form of the game (i.e., we cannot isolate the
action) because the state-transition function is not invertible
(e.g., when the state transition function is quadratic in the
action variable). The more general case of DPG in nonreduced
form was studied with the Pontryagin’s maximum principle
approach by [5] and [8] for discrete and continuous time
models, respectively. However, in all these studies [3]–[8],
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2the games have been analyzed without explicitly considering
constraints for the state and action sets.
Other works that consider potential games with state-
dynamics include [9]–[11]. However, these references study
the myopic problem in which the agents aim to maximize
their immediate reward. This is different from DPG, where
the agents aim to maximize their long term utility by solving
a control problem.
Dynamic games offer two kinds of possible analysis based
on the type of control that players use. These cases are
normally referred to as open loop (OL) and closed loop (CL)
game analysis. In the open loop approach, in order to find the
optimal action sequence, the players have to take into account
other players’ action sequences. On the other hand, in a closed
loop approach, players find a strategy that is a function of the
state, i.e., it is a mapping from states to actions. Thus, in order
to find their optimal policies, they need to know the form
of other players’ policy functions. The OL analysis has, in
general, more tractable analysis than the CL analysis. Indeed,
there are only few CL known solutions for simple games,
such as the fish war example presented in [12], oligopolistic
Cournot games [13], or quadratic games [14].
The main theoretical contribution of this work is to analyze
DPG with constrained action and state sets, as it is required
by most of applications (e.g., in a network flow problem, the
aggregated throughput of multiple users is bounded by the
maximum link capacity; or in cognitive radio, the aggregated
power of all secondary users is bounded by the maximum
interference allowed by the primary users). To do so, we
apply the Euler-Lagrange equation to the Lagrangian (as it
is customary in the MOCP literature [15]), rather than to the
utility function (as done by earlier works [3] and [7]). Using
the Lagrangian, we can formulate the optimality condition in
the general nonreduced form (i.e., it is not necessary to isolate
the action in the transition equation). In addition, we establish
the existence of a suitable conservative vector field as an easily
verifiable condition for a dynamic game to be of the potential
type. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel extension
of the conditions established for static games by [16] and [17].
The second main contribution of this work is to show that
the proposed framework can be applied to several commu-
nication and networking problems in a unified manner. We
present four examples with increasing complexity level. First,
we model the energy demand control in a smart grid network
as a linear-quadratic-dynamic-game (LQDG). This scenario
is illustrative because the analytical solution of an LQDG
is known. The second example is an optimal network flow
problem, in which there are two levels of relay nodes equipped
with finite batteries. The users aim to maximize their flow
while optimizing the use of the nodes’ batteries. This problem
illustrates that, when the utilities have some separable form,
it is straightforward to establish that the problem is a DPG.
However, the analytical solution for this problem is unknown
and we have to solve it numerically. It turns out that, since
all batteries will deplete eventually, the game will get stuck in
this depletion-state. Hence, we can approximate the infinite-
horizon MOCP by an effective finite-horizon problem, which
simplifies the numerical computation. The third example is
an uplink multiple access channel wherein the users’ devices
are also equipped with batteries (this example was introduced
in the preliminary paper [18]). Again, the simple—but more
realistic—extension of battery-usage optimization makes the
game dynamic. In this example, instead of rewriting the util-
ities in a separable form, we perform a very general analysis
to establish that the problem is a DPG. The fourth example
studies two decentralized scheduling problems: proportional
fair and equal rate scheduling, where multiple users share a
time-varying channel (see the preliminary paper [19]). This
example shows how to use the proposed framework in its
most general form. The problems are nonconcave and the
utilities have a nonobvious separable form. The problem is
nonstationary, with state-transition equation changing with
time. And there is no reason that justifies a finite horizon
approximation of the problem, so we have to use optimal
control methods (e.g., dynamic programming) to solve it
numerically.
Outline: Sec. II introduces the problem setting, its solution
and the assumptions on which we base our analysis. In Sec. III,
we review static potential games together with the instrumental
notion of conservative vector field. In Sec. IV, we provide
sufficient conditions for a dynamic game with constrained state
and action sets to be a DPG, and show that a DPG can be
solved through and equivalent MOCP. Sections V–VIII deal
with application examples, the methods for solving them, and
some illustrative simulations. We provide some conclusions in
Sec. IX.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
Let Q , {1, . . . , Q} denote the set of players and let
X ⊆ <S denote the set of states of the game. Note that
the dimensionality of the state set can be different from the
number of players (i.e., S 6= Q). At every time step t, the state-
vector of the game is represented by xt ,
(
xkt
)S
k=1
∈ X .
Every player i ∈ Q can be influenced only by a subset
of states X i ⊆ X . The partition of the state space X
among players is done in the component domain. We define
X (i) ⊆ {1, . . . , S} as the subset of indexes of state-vector
components that influence player i, then xit , (xmt )m∈X (i)
indicates the value of the state-vector for player i at time t.
This generality allows for games in which multiple players are
affected by common components of the state vector (e.g., when
they share a common resource), and includes the particular
case wherein they share no components. We also define
x−it ,
(
xlt
)
l/∈X (i) ∈ X−i for the vector of components that
do not influence player i, for some subset X−i ⊆ X .
Let U ⊆ <Q denote the set of actions of all players, and
let U i ⊆ < stand for the subset of actions of player i, such
that U ,∏Qi=1 U i. The extension to higher dimensional action
sets is straightforward (i.e., when U i ⊆ <Ai ), but we restrict
to scalar actions in order to simplify notation (the general case
will be introduced when necessary for some of the application
examples). We write uit ∈ U i the action variable of player
i at time t, such that the vector ut ,
(
u1t , . . . , u
Q
t
)
∈ U
contains the actions of all players. We also define u−it ,(
u1t , . . . , u
i−1
t , u
i+1
t , . . . , u
Q
t
)
∈ U−i , ∏j 6=i U j as the
3vector of all players’ actions except that of player i. Hence,
by slightly abusing notation, we can rewrite ut =
(
uit,u
−i
t
)
.
The state transitions are determined by f : X×U×N→ X ,
such that the nonstationary Markovian dynamic equation of
the game is xt+1 = f(xt,ut, t), which can be split among
components: xkt+1 = f
k(xt,ut, t) for k = 1, . . . , S, such
that f ,
(
fk
)S
k=1
. The dynamic is Markovian because the
state transition to xt+1 depends on the current state-action
pair (xt,ut), rather than on the whole history of state-action
pairs {(x0,u0), . . . (xt,ut)}. We remark that f corresponds
to a nonreduced form, such that there is no function ϕ such
that ut = ϕ(xt,xt+1, t).
We include a vector of C nonstationary constraints g ,
(gc)
C
c=1, as it is required by most applications, and define the
sets Ct , {X ×U}∩{(xt,ut) : g(xt,ut, t) ≤ 0}∩{(xt,ut) :
xt+1 = f(xt,ut, t)}.
Each player has its nonstationary utility function pii :
X i × U × N → <, such that, at every time t, each player
receives a utility value equal to pii(xit, u
i
t,u
−i
t , t). The aim of
player i is to find the sequence of actions {ui0, . . . , uit, . . .} that
maximizes its long term cumulative utility, given other players’
sequence of actions {u−i0 , . . . ,u−it , . . .}. Thus, a discrete-
time infinite-horizon noncooperative nonstationary Markovian
dynamic game can be represented as a set of Q coupled
optimal control problems:
G1 :
∀i ∈ Q
maximize
{uit}∈
∏∞
t=0 Ui
∞∑
t=0
βtpii(xit, u
i
t,u
−i
t , t)
s.t. xt+1 = f(xt,ut, t), x0 given
g(xt,ut, t) ≤ 0
(1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor that bounds the
cumulative utility (for simplicity, we define the same β for
every player). Note that, since the players can share state-
vector components, the constraints may affect every player’s
feasible region. Problem (1) is infinite-horizon because the
reward is accumulated over infinite time steps.
The solution concept of problem (1) in which we are
interested is the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game, which
is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A solution of problem (1), known as a Nash
Equilibrium (NE), is a feasible sequence of actions {u?t }∞t=0
that satisfies the following condition for every player i ∈ Q:
∞∑
t=0
βtpii(xit, u
?i
t ,u
?−i
t , t) ≥
∞∑
t=0
βtpii(xit, u
i
t,u
?−i
t , t)
∀(xt,ut) ∈ Ct (2)
We consider the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. The utilities pii are twice continuously differ-
entiable in X × U .
Assumption 2. The state and action spaces, X and U , are
open and convex subsets of a real vector space.
Assumption 3. The state-transition function f and the con-
straints g are continuously differentiable in X ×U and satisfy
some regularity conditions.
In general, finding an NE of problem (1) is a difficult
task because the utilities, dynamic equation and constraints
of the individual optimal control problems (OCP) are coupled
among players. However, when problem (1) is a DPG, we
can solve it through an equivalent MOCP—as opposed to
a set of coupled univariate OCP. We use Assumptions 1
and 2 to obtain a verifiable condition for problem (1) to be
a DPG. Assumption 3 is required to introduce the condi-
tions that guarantee equivalence between the solution of the
MOCP and an NE of the original DPG. In particular, since
we derive the KKT optimality conditions for both problems
(namely the DPG and the MOCP), some regularity conditions
(such as Slater’s, the linear independence of gradients or the
Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualifications) are required
to ensure that the KKT conditions hold at the optimal points
and that feasible dual variables exist (see, e.g., [20, Sec. 3.3.5],
[21]). Finally, we introduce one further assumption in Sec. IV
to ensure existence of a solution to the MOCP and, hence,
existence of an NE of the DPG.
This equivalence between DPG and MOCP generalizes the
well studied but simpler case of static potential games [16],
[17], which is reviewed in the following section.
III. OVERVIEW OF STATIC POTENTIAL GAMES
Static games are a simplified version of dynamic games in
the sense that there are neither states, nor system dynamics.
The aim of each player i, given other players’ actions u−i, is
to choose an action ui ∈ U i that maximizes its utility function:
G2 : ∀i ∈ Q
maximize
ui∈Ui
pii(ui,u−i)
s.t. g(u) ≤ 0
(3)
where (similar to dynamic games but removing the time-
dependence subscript) ui ∈ U i refers to the action of player
i; and u−i = (uj)j∈Q:j 6=i is the set of actions of the rest of
agents, such that u = (ui,u−i) ∈ U denotes the set of all
players’ actions. We assume U ⊆ <Q to be open and convex.
In general, finding or even characterizing the set of equi-
librium points (e.g., in terms of existence or uniqueness) of
problem (3) is difficult. Fortunately, there are particular cases
of this problem for which the analysis is greatly simplified.
Potential games is one of these cases.
Definition 2. Let Assumptions 1–2 hold. Then, problem (3) is
called a static potential game if there is a function Π : U → <,
named the potential, that satisfies the following condition for
every player [17]:
pii(ui,u−i)− pii(vi,u−i) = Π(ui,u−i)−Π(vi,u−i)
∀ui, vi ∈ U i, ∀i ∈ Q (4)
Under Assumptions 1–2, it can be shown (see, e.g., [17,
Lemma 4.4]) that a necessary and sufficient condition for a
static game to be potential is the following:
∂pii(u)
∂ui
=
∂Π(u)
∂ui
, ∀i ∈ Q (5)
We can gain insight on potential games by relating (5) to
4the concept of conservative vector field. The following lemma
will be useful to this end.
Lemma 1. Let F(u) = (F1(u), . . . , FQ(u)) be a vector field
with continuous derivatives defined over an open convex set
U ∈ <Q. The following conditions on F are equivalent:
1) There exists a scalar potential function Π(u) such that
F(u) = ∇Π(u), where ∇ is the gradient.
2) The partial derivatives satisfy
∂Fj(u)
∂ui
=
∂Fi(u)
∂uj
, ∀u ∈ U , i, j = 1, . . . , Q (6)
3) Let a be a fixed point of U . For any piecewise smooth
path ξ joining a with u, we have Π(u) =
∫ u
a
F(ξ) · dξ.
A vector field satisfying these conditions is called conservative.
Proof: See, e.g., [22, Theorems 10.4, 10.5 and 10.9].
Let us define a vector field with components the partial
derivatives of the players’ utilities:
F(u) ,
(
∂pi1(u)
∂u1
, . . . ,
∂piQ(u)
∂uQ
)
(7)
Let us rewrite (7) more compactly as F(u) = ∇Π(u) so that
Lemma 1.1 holds. Then, we have that ∂pi
i(u)
∂ui =
∂Π(u)
∂ui , ∀i ∈Q. Note that this is exactly condition given by (5). It follows
from Lemma 1.2 that a necessary, sufficient and also easily
verifiable condition for problem (3) to be a static potential
game is given by:
∂2pii(u)
∂ui∂uj
=
∂2pij(u)
∂ui∂uj
, ∀i, j ∈ Q (8)
Finally, Lemma 1.3 is useful since we can find the potential
function Π by solving the line integral of the field:
Π(u) =
∫ 1
0
Q∑
i=1
∂pii(ξi(λ),u−i)
∂ui
dξi(λ)
dλ
dλ (9)
where ξ ,
(
ξi
)
i∈Q is a piecewise smooth path in U that
connects the initial and final conditions: ξ(0) = a, ξ(1) = u.
Once we have found Π, it can be seen [16] that necessary
conditions for u? to be an equilibrium of the game (3) are also
necessary conditions for the following optimization problem:
P1 :
maximize
u∈U
Π(u)
s.t. g(u) ≤ 0
(10)
Indeed, optimization theorems concerning existence and con-
vergence can now be applied to game (3). In particular,
reference [16] showed that the local maxima of the potential
function are a subset of the NE of the game. Furthermore,
in the case that all players’ utilities are quasi-concave, the
maximum is unique and coincides with the stable equilibrium
of the game.
This same approach can be extended to dynamic games.
Nevertheless, instead of obtaining an analogous optimization
problem, DPG will yield an analogous MOCP.
IV. DYNAMIC POTENTIAL GAMES WITH CONSTRAINTS
This section introduces the main theoretical contribution of
the paper: we establish conditions under which we can find an
NE of problem (1) by solving an alternative MOCP, instead
of having to solve the set of coupled infinite horizon OCP
with coupled constraints. First, we introduce the definition of
a DPG and show conditions for problem (1) to belong to this
class. Then, we introduce the alternative MOCP and prove that
its solution is an NE of the game.
Definition 3. Problem (1) is called a DPG if there is a function
Π : X × U ×N → <, named the potential, that satisfies the
following condition for every player i ∈ Q:
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
pii(xit, u
i
t,u
−i
t , t)− pii(xit, vit,u−it , t)
)
=
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Π(xt, u
i
t,u
−i
t , t)−Π(xt, vit,u−it , t)
)
∀xt ∈ X , ∀uit, vit ∈ U i (11)
Note that, although the potential function Π is defined for
the larger set X ×U×N, the local objective pii is only defined
over its local subset X i × U × N. Therefore, we only have
to check whether condition (11) is satisfied in each players’
subset.
The following three lemmas give conditions under which
problem (1) is a DPG (i.e., it satisfies Definition 3).
Lemma 2. Problem (1) is a DPG if there exists some function
Π (xt,ut, t) that satisfies
∂pii
(
xit,ut, t
)
∂xmt
=
∂Π (xt,ut, t)
∂xmt
∂pii
(
xit,ut, t
)
∂uit
=
∂Π (xt,ut, t)
∂uit
∀m ∈ X (i), ∀i ∈ Q, t = 0, . . . ,∞ (12)
Proof: We simply extend to dynamic games the argument
for static games due to [16, Prop. 1]. From (12) and Assump-
tion 1 we have:
∂
∂xmt
(
Π (xt,ut, t)− pii
(
xit,ut, t
))
= 0, ∀m ∈ X (i) (13)
∂
∂uit
(
Π (xt,ut, t)− pii
(
xit,ut, t
))
= 0 (14)
This means that the difference between the potential and each
player’s utility depends neither on xmt nor u
i
t. Thus, we can
express this difference as
Π
(
xt, u
i,u−it , t
) − pii (xit, uit,u−i, t)
= Θ(x−it ,u
−i
t , t) ∀ui ∈ U i (15)
for some function Θ : X−i × U−i × N → <. Since (15) is
satisfied for every ui ∈ U i, we can subtract two versions of
(15) with actions ui and vi in U i. Then, by arranging terms
and summing over all t, we obtain (11).
Condition (12) is usually difficult to check in practice
because we do not know Π beforehand. Fortunately, there
are cases in which the player’s utilities have some separable
structure that allows us to easily deduce that the game is of
the potential type, as it is explained in the following lemma.
5Lemma 3. Problem (1) is a DPG if the utility function of
every player i ∈ Q can be expressed as the sum of a term
that is common to all players plus another term that depends
neither on its own action, nor on its own state-components:
pii
(
xit, u
i
t,u
−i
t , t
)
= Π
(
xt, u
i
t,u
−i
t , t
)
+ Θ(x−it ,u
−i
t , t) (16)
Proof: By taking the partial derivative of (16) we obtain
(12). Therefore, we can apply Lemma 2 (see also [16, Prop.
1]).
However, posing the utility in the separable structure (16)
may be difficult. We need a more general framework that
allows us to check whether problem (3) is a DPG when the
player’s utilities have a nonobvious separable structure. This
framework is formally introduced in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Problem (1) is a DPG if all players’ utilities satisfy
the following conditions, ∀i, j ∈ Q, ∀m ∈ X (i), ∀n ∈ X (j):
∂2pii(xit,ut, t)
∂xmt ∂u
j
t
=
∂2pij(xjt ,ut, t)
∂xnt ∂u
i
t
(17)
∂2pii(xit,ut, t)
∂xmt ∂x
n
t
=
∂2pij(xjt ,ut, t)
∂xnt ∂x
m
t
(18)
∂2pii(xit,ut, t)
∂uit∂u
j
t
=
∂2pij(xjt ,ut, t)
∂ujt∂u
i
t
(19)
Proof: Under Assumption 1, we can introduce the fol-
lowing vector field:
F ,
(
∇x1tpi1(x1t ,ut, t)>, . . . ,∇xQt pi
Q(xQt ,ut, t)
>
,
∂pi1(x1t ,ut, t)
∂u1t
, . . . ,
∂piQ(xQt ,ut, t)
∂uQt
)
(20)
where∇xitpii(xit,ut, t) =
(
∂pii(xit,ut,t)
∂xmt
)
m∈X (i)
. From Lemma
2, we can express (20) as
F = ∇Π(xt,ut, t) (21)
From Assumption 2 and Lemma 1.1, we know that F is
conservative. Hence, Lemma 1.2 establishes that the second
partial derivatives must satisfy (17)–(19).
Introduce the following MOCP:
P2 :
maximize
{ut}∈
∏∞
t=0 U
∞∑
t=0
βtΠ(xt,ut, t)
s.t. xt+1 = f(xt,ut, t), x0 given
g(xt,ut, t) ≤ 0
(22)
Let us consider the following assumption, which is needed for
establishing equivalence between a DPG and the MOCP (22).
Assumption 4. The MOCP (22) has a nonempty solution set.
Sufficient—and easily verifiable—conditions to satisfy As-
sumption 4 are given by the following lemma, which is a
standard result in optimal control theory.
Lemma 5. Let Π : X ×U ×N→ [−∞,∞) be a proper con-
tinuous function. And let any one of the following conditions
hold for t = 1, . . . ,∞:
1) The constraint sets Ct are bounded.
2) Π(xt,ut, t)→ −∞ as ‖(xt,ut)‖ → ∞ (coercive).
3) There exists a scalar M such that the level sets, defined
by {(xt,ut, t)|Π(xt,ut, t) ≥M}∞t=1, are nonempty and
bounded.
Then, ∀x0 ∈ X , there exists an optimal sequence of actions
{u?t }∞t=0 that is solution to the MOCP (22). Moreover, there
exists an optimal policy φ? : X ×N→ U , which is a mapping
from states to optimal actions, such that when applied over
the state-trajectory {xt}∞t=0, it provides an optimal sequence
of actions {u?t , φ?(xt, t)}∞t=0.
Proof: Since Π is proper, it has some nonempty level
set. Since Π is continuous, its bounded level sets are compact.
Hence, we can use [23, Prop. 3.1.7] (see, also [23, Sections
1.2 and 3.6]) to establish existence of an optimal policy.
The main theoretical result of this work is that we can find
an NE of a DPG by solving the MOCP (22). This is proved
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If problem (1) is a DPG, under Assumptions 1–
4, the solution of the MOCP (22) is an NE of (1) when the
objective function of the MOCP is given by
Π(xt,ut, t) =
∫ 1
0
Q∑
i=1
( ∑
m∈X (i)
∂pii(η(λ),ut, t)
∂xmt
dηm(λ)
dλ
+
∂pii(xt, ξ(λ), t)
∂uit
dξi(λ)
dλ
)
dλ (23)
where η(λ) ,
(
ηk(λ)
)S
k=1
, ξ(λ) ,
(
ξi(λ)
)Q
i=1
, and η(0)-
ξ(0) and η(1)-ξ(1) correspond to the initial and final state-
action conditions, respectively.
The usefulness of Theorem 1 is that, in order to find an NE
of (1), instead of solving several coupled control problems, we
can check whether (1) is a DPG (i.e., anyone of Lemmas 2–4
holds). If so, we can find an NE by computing the potential
function (23) and, then, by solving the equivalent MOCP (22).
Proof: The proof is structured in five steps. First, we
compute the Euler equation of the Lagrangian of the dynamic
game and derive the KKT optimality conditions. Assumption
3 is required to ensure that the KKT conditions hold at the
optimal point and that there exist feasible dual variables [20,
Prop. 3.3.8]. Second, we study when the necessary optimality
conditions of the game become equal to those of the MOCP.
Third, we show that having the same necessary optimality
conditions is sufficient condition for the dynamic game to be
potential. Fourth, having established that the dynamic game
is a DPG we show that the solution to the MOCP (whose
existence is guaranteed by Assumption 4) is also an NE of
the DPG. Finally, we derive the per stage utility of the MOCP
as the potential function of a suitable vector field. We proceed
to explain the details.
First, for problem (1), introduce each player’s Lagrangian
∀i ∈ Q:
Li(xt,ut,λit,µit) = ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
pii
(
xit,ut, t
)
6+ λi
>
t (f (xt,ut, t)− xt+1) + µi
>
t g (xt,ut, t)
)
=
∞∑
t=0
βtΦi
(
xt,ut, t,λ
i
t,µ
i
t
)
(24)
where λit ,
(
λikt
)S
k=1
and µit ,
(
µict
)C
c=1
are the correspond-
ing vectors of multipliers, and we introduced the shorthand:
Φi
(
xt,ut, t,λ
i
t,µ
i
t
)
, pii
(
xit,ut, t
)
+ λi
>
t (f (xt,ut, t)− xt+1) + µi
>
t g (xt,ut, t) (25)
The discrete time Euler-Lagrange equations [15, Sec. 6.1]
applied to each player’s Lagrangian are given by:
∂Φi
(
xt−1,ut−1, t− 1,λit−1,µit−1
)
∂xmt
+
∂Φi
(
xt,ut, t,λ
i
t,µ
i
t
)
∂xmt
= 0, ∀m ∈ X (i) (26)
∂Φi
(
xt−1,ut−1, t− 1,λit−1,µit−1
)
∂uit
+
∂Φi
(
xt,ut, t,λ
i
t,µ
i
t
)
∂uit
= 0 (27)
Actually, note that (26)–(27) are the Euler-Lagrange equations
in a more general form than the standard reduced form. As
mentioned in Sec. II (see also, e.g., [15, Sec. 6.1], [3]), in the
standard reduced form, the current action can be posed as a
function of the current and future states: ut = ϕ(xt,xt+1, t),
for some function ϕ : X × X ×N→ U . The reason why we
introduced this general form of the Euler-Lagrange equations
is that such function ϕ may not exist for an arbitrary state-
transition function f . By substituting (25) into (26)–(27), and
adding the corresponding constraints, we obtain the KKT
conditions of the game for every player i ∈ Q, the state-
components m ∈ X (i), and all extra constraints:
∂pii
(
xit,ut, t
)
∂xmt
+
S∑
k=1
λikt
∂fk (xt,ut, t)
∂xmt
+
C∑
c=1
µict
∂gc (xt,ut, t)
∂xmt
− λimt−1 = 0 (28)
∂pii
(
xit,ut, t
)
∂uit
+
S∑
k=1
λikt
∂fk (xt,ut, t)
∂uit
+
C∑
c=1
µict
∂gc (xt,ut, t)
∂uit
= 0 (29)
xt+1 = f (xt,ut, t) , g (xt,ut, t) ≤ 0 (30)
µit ≤ 0, µi
>
t g (xt,ut, t) = 0 (31)
Second, we find the KKT conditions of the MOCP. To do
so, we obtain the Lagrangian of (22):
LΠ(xt,ut,γt, δt) =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Π (xt,ut, t)
+ γ>t (f (xt,ut, t)− xt+1) + δ>t g (xt,ut, t)
)
(32)
where γt ,
(
γkt
)S
k=1
and δt , (δct )
C
c=1 are the corresponding
multipliers. Again, from (32) we derive the Euler-Lagrange
equations, which, together with the corresponding constraints,
yield the KKT system of optimality conditions for all state-
components, m = 1, . . . , S, and all actions, i = 1, . . . , Q:
∂Π (xt,ut, t)
∂xmt
+
S∑
k=1
γkt
∂fk (xt,ut, t)
∂xmt
+
C∑
c=1
δct
∂gc (xt,ut, t)
∂xmt
− γmt−1 = 0 (33)
∂Π (xt,ut, t)
∂uit
+
S∑
k=1
γkt
∂fk (xt,ut, t)
∂uit
+
C∑
c=1
δct
∂gc (xt,ut, t)
∂uit
= 0 (34)
xt+1 = f (xt,ut, t) , g (xt,ut, t) ≤ 0 (35)
δt ≤ 0, δ>t g (xt,ut, t) = 0 (36)
In order for the MOCP (22) to have the same optimality
conditions as the game (1), by comparing (28)–(31) with
(33)–(36), we conclude that the following conditions must be
satisfied ∀i ∈ Q:
∂pii
(
xit,ut, t
)
∂xmt
=
∂Π (xt,ut, t)
∂xmt
, ∀m ∈ X (i) (37)
∂pii
(
xit,ut, t
)
∂uit
=
∂Π (xt,ut, t)
∂uit
(38)
λit = γt , µ
i
t = δt (39)
Third, when conditions (37)–(38) are satisfied, Lemma 2
states that problem (1) is a DPG.
Fourth, note that condition (39) represents a feasible point
of the game. The reason is that if there exists an optimal
primal variable, then the existence of dual variables in the
MOCP is guaranteed by suitable regularity conditions. Since
the existence of optimal primal variables of the MOCP is
ensured by Assumption 4, the regularity conditions established
by Assumption 3 guarantee that there exist some γt and δt
that satisfy the KKT conditions of the MOCP. Substituting
these dual variables of the MOCP in place of the individual
λit and µ
i
t in (28)–(31) for every i ∈ Q, results in a system
of equations where the only unknowns are the user strategies.
This system has exactly the same structure as the one already
presented for the MOCP in the primal variables. Therefore,
the MOCP primal solution also satisfies the KKT conditions
of the DPG. Indeed, it is straightforward to see that an optimal
solution of the MOCP is also an NE of the game. Let {u?t }∞t=0
denote the MOCP solution, so that it satisfies the following
inequality ∀uit ∈ U i:
∞∑
t=0
βtΠ(xt, u
i?
t ,u
?−i
t , t) ≥
∞∑
t=0
βtΠ(xt, u
i
t,u
?−i
t , t) (40)
From Definition 3, we conclude that the MOCP optimal
solution is also an NE of game (1). The opposite may not be
true in general. Indeed, this solution, in which dual variables
are shared between players, is only a subclass of the possible
NE of the game. Nevertheless, other NE that do not share this
7property have been referred to as unstable by [16] for static
games.
Fifth, although we have shown that we can find an NE of the
DPG by solving a MOCP, we still need to find the objective
of the MOCP. In order to find Π, we deduce from (37), (38),
(20) and (21) that the vector field (20) can be expressed as
F , ∇Π (xt,ut, t) (41)
Lemma 1 establishes that F is conservative. Thus, the objective
of the MOCP is the potential of the field, which can be
computed through the line integral (23).
In the next sections, we show how to apply this
methodology—of solving DPG through an equivalent
MOCP—to different practical problems.
V. ENERGY DEMAND IN THE SMART GRID
AS A LINEAR QUADRATIC DYNAMIC GAME
Our first example consists in a linear-quadratic-dynamic-
game (LQDG) that solves a smart grid resource allocation
problem. LQDG are convenient because they are amenable to
analytical and closed form solutions [24, Ch. 6]. Our analysis
is novel though. To the best of our knowledge, LQDG have
not been studied under the easier DPG framework before.
A. Energy demand control DPG and equivalent MOCP
Consider a community of Q users (i.e., players) that use the
smart grid resources in different activities (like communica-
tions, heating, lighting, home appliances or production needs).
Suppose that the electrical grid has S types of energy resources
(such as rechargeable batteries, coal, fuel, hydroelectric power
or biomass). The state of the game xt ∈ <S is the total
amount of overall resources in the smart grid at time t. All
players share all components of the state-vector (i.e., X i = X
and X (i) = {1, . . . , S}, ∀i ∈ Q). The amount of resources
consumed or contributed by player i at time t is denoted by the
action vector uit ∈ <A
i
, where Ai is the number of activities.
The expenditure and contribution of each player i is
weighted by matrix Bi ∈ <S×Ai . Also, resources can be
autonomously recharged/depleted, which is modeled by a
shared matrix C ∈ <S×S . Thus, the state transition of the
system is f = Cxt +
∑
i∈QB
iuit.
We consider two cost terms: unsatisfied demand and un-
balanced resources. Given the available resources xt, every
player i will have a target demand Dixt that it wants to
satisfy, for some demand matrix Di ∈ <Ai×S . The disutility
from an unsatisfied demand is modelled by the quadratic
form
(
Dixt − uit
)>
Qi
(
Dixt − uit
)
, with demand cost ma-
trix Qi ∈ <Ai×Ai . In addition, the available resources should
be just enough to satisfy the demand. There is a cost for
having too little (e.g., productivity decrease) or too much (e.g.,
storage costs) resources. This cost can be modeled as another
quadratic form: (xt − xt−1)>R (xt − xt−1), with unbalanced
resources cost matrix R ∈ <S×S . In order to pose the game as
a maximization problem, we assume {Qi}∀i∈Q to be negative
definite matrices, and R a negative semidefinite matrix (this
is represented by Qi ≺ 0 and R  0).
The dynamic energy demand control game is given by the
following coupled optimal control problems:
G3 :
∀i ∈ Q
maximize
{uit}∈
∏∞
t=0 Ui
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(xt − xt−1)>R (xt − xt−1)
+
(
Dixt − uit
)>
Qi
(
Dixt − uit
) )
s.t. xt+1 = Cxt +
Q∑
i=1
Biuit, x0 given
(42)
By defining augmented state and action vectors:
x˜>t ,
[
x>t ,x
>
t−1,
]>
, u˜it , Dixt − uit (43)
we can rewrite (42) in the standard linear-quadratic form:
maximize
{uit}∈
∏∞
t=0 Ui
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
x˜>t R˜x˜t + u˜
i>
t Q
iu˜it
)
s.t. x˜t+1 = Ax˜t −
Q∑
i=1
B˜iu˜it, x0 given
(44)
where
A ,
[
C+
∑
i∈QB
iDi 0S×S
IS 0S×S
]
, B˜i ,
[
Bi
0S×Ai
]
(45)
R˜ ,
[
R −R
−R R
]
(46)
and where IS and 0S×S denote the identity and null matrices
of size S × S, respectively. LQDG games in the form (44)
have been presented in [24, Ch. 6], where an NE is found
by i) solving the system of coupled finite horizon OCP, ii)
finding the limit of this solution as the horizon tends to infinity,
and then iii) verifying that this limiting solution provides a
NE solution for the infinite-horizon game. Here we follow a
different and simpler approach. First, we show that problem
(44) can be expressed in the separable form (16):
pii(x˜t,u˜t) = x˜
>
t R˜x˜t + u˜
i>
t Q
iu˜it
= x˜>t R˜x˜t +
∑
p∈Q
u˜p
>
t Q
pu˜pt −
∑
j∈Q:j 6=i
u˜j
>
t Q
ju˜jt (47)
We identify the potential and separable functions in (47):
Π (x˜t, u˜t, t) = x˜
>
t R˜x˜t +
∑
p∈Q
u˜p
>
t Q
pu˜pt (48)
Θ(u˜−it , t) = −
∑
j∈Q:j 6=i
u˜j
>
t Q
ju˜jt (49)
From Lemma 3, we conclude that problem (42) is a DPG.
Note also that Assumptions 1–2 hold. Moreover, the objective
in (44) is concave and the state dynamics—which is the only
equality constraint—are linear. Therefore, Slater’s constraint
qualification is satisfied and Assumption 3 holds. In addition,
the matrices Qi ≺ 0, ∀i ∈ Q, and R  0 make the potential
(49) coercive. Hence, Lemma 5 states that Assumption 4 is
satisfied. Since Assumptions 1–4 hold, Theorem 1 establishes
that we can find an NE of (42) by solving an equivalent
8MOCP:
P3 :
maximize
{ut}∈
∏∞
t=0 U
V (x˜0) ,
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
x˜>t R˜x˜t
+
∑
p∈Q
u˜p
>
t Q
pu˜pt
)
s.t. x˜t+1 = Ax˜t −
Q∑
i=1
B˜iu˜it, x˜0 given
(50)
where the cumulative objective function V is known as value
function in the optimal control literature (see, e.g., [23]). Let
u˜t ,
(
u˜it
)Q
i=1
be the vector of all players’ augmented actions.
Aggregate all players’ demand matrices in a block diagonal
matrix Q , diag
(
Q1, . . . ,QQ
)
of size
∑Q
i=1A
i×∑Qi=1Ai,
and aggregate all players’ expenditure weighting matrices in
a S ×∑Qi=1Ai thick matrix B˜ , (B˜1, . . . , B˜Q). Then, we
can rewrite the value and transition functions as follows:
V (x˜0) =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
u˜>t Qu˜t + x˜
>
t R˜x˜t
)
(51)
x˜t+1 = Ax˜t −Bu˜t (52)
B. Analytical solution to the MOCP and simulation results
It is well known that the value function satisfies a recursive
relationship, known as Bellman equation (see, e.g., [23]):
V (x˜t) = β
t
(
u˜>t Qu˜t + x˜
>
t R˜x˜t
)
+ βt+1V (x˜t+1) (53)
Moreover, for an LQ control problem, it is known [24, Ch. 6]
that the optimal value function can be expressed as a quadratic
form of the state:
V (x˜t) = x˜
>
t Px˜t (54)
for some negative semidefinite matrix P. We can use (54)
to find a closed form expression for the sequence of optimal
actions as follows. Expand (52) and (54) into (53):
V (x˜t) = β
t
(
u˜>t Qu˜t + x˜
>
t R˜x˜t
)
+ βt+1 (Ax˜t −Bu˜t)>P (Ax˜t −Bu˜t) (55)
Now, we just have to maximize (55) over u˜t. Since Q and P
are negative definite and semidefinite matrices, respectively, a
necessary and sufficient condition for the maximum is
∇u˜tV (x˜t) = βtQu˜t − βt+1B>P (Ax˜t −Bu˜t) = 0 (56)
From (56), we obtain an analytical expression for the optimal
action at any time step:
u˜t = β
(
Q+ βB>PB
)−1
B>PAx˜t (57)
If we are also interested in finding the optimal value, we
can expand (57) into (55) and isolate P:
P = R˜+ βA>PA
− β2A>PB (Q+ βB>PB)−1B>PA (58)
Note that (58) is a discrete algebraic Riccati equation, which
is known to be a contraction mapping if Q ≺ 0, R˜  0 and
the spectral radius of A is smaller than one [25, Ch. 5] (the
analysis can be performed under weaker conditions though
[23], [26]). When (58) is a contraction, it has a unique solution
P? that can be approximated by iterating the following fixed
point equation, such that limn→∞Pn = P?:
Pn+1 = R˜+ βA
>PnA
− β2A>PnB
(
Q+ βB>PnB
)−1
B>PnA (59)
We have simulated the smart grid model for Q = 8 players,
S = 4 resources, Ai = 6 activities for every player, random
negative definite matrices Qi, ∀i ∈ Q, and random negative
semidefinite matrix R (to build these negative matrices we
build an intermediate matrix, e.g., Rint, by drawing random
numbers from a uniform distribution, with support [0, 10] for
Qi and [0, 5] for R, and compute R = −R>intRint). Matrices
C, Bi and Di are also random with elements drawn from the
spherical normal distribution. Finally, the initial state was set
to a vector of ones, and discount factor β = 0.9.
Figure 1-Top shows the instant utilities per player over time.
Recall that the utilities have been defined as negative costs.
Therefore, each player’s utility starts being a negative value
and converges to zero with time. This behaviour illustrates that
all players attain an NE in which they are able to satisfy their
demand as well as to hold just enough available resources.
Figure 1-Bottom shows the evolution of the part of the cost
corresponding to the individual coefficients u˜it = D
ixt − uit.
These coefficients represent the mismatch among target de-
mand, Dixt, and the actual player activities uit. We can see
that the agents adjust their actions uit to satisfy the target
demand. The equilibrium between target demand and players’
activities is an expected consequence of the stability of the
LQ game in infinite horizon [24, Ch. 6].
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Fig. 1. Dynamic smart grid scenario with Q = 8 players. (Top) Instant utility
values of players. (Bottom) Players’ decision coefficients evolution in time.
9VI. NETWORK FLOW CONTROL: INFINITE HORIZON
APPROXIMATED BY A FINITE HORIZON DYNAMIC GAME
Several works (see, e.g., [27]–[30]) have considered network
flow control as an optimization problem wherein each source
is characterized by a utility function that depends on the
transmission rate, and the goal is to maximize the aggregated
utility. We generalize the standard model by considering that
the nodes are equipped with batteries that are depleted propor-
tionally to the outgoing flow. In addition we consider several
layers of relay nodes, each one with multiple links, so there
are several paths between source and destination. When the
batteries are completely depleted, no more transmissions are
allowed and the game is over. Hence, although we formulate
the problem as an infinite horizon dynamic game, the effective
time horizon—before the batteries deplete—is finite. This
problem has no known analytical solution, but the utilities
are concave. Therefore, the finite horizon approximation is
convenient because we can solve an equivalent concave op-
timization problem, significantly reducing the computational
load with respect to other optimal control algorithms (e.g.,
dynamic programming).
A. Network flow control dynamic game and equivalent MOCP
Let uiat denote the flow along path a for user i at time t.
Suppose there are Ai possible paths for each player i ∈ Q,
so that uit ,
(
uiat
)Ai
a=1
denotes the i-th player’s action vector.
Let A =
∑Q
i=1A
i denote the total number of available paths.
Suppose there are S relay nodes. Let xkt denote the battery
level of relay node k. The state of the game is given by xt ,(
xkt
)S
k=1
, such that all players share all components of the
state-vector (i.e., X i = X and X (i) = {1, . . . , S}, ∀i ∈ Q).
The battery level evolves with the following state-transition
equation for all components k = 1, . . . , S:
xkt+1 = x
k
t − δ
Q∑
i=1
∑
uia∈Fk
uiat , x
k
0 = B
k
max (60)
where Fk denotes the subset of flows through node k, Bkmax
is a positive scalar that stands for the maximum battery level
of node k, and δ is a proportional factor.
Similar to the standard static flow control problem, each
player intends to maximize a concave function Γ : U i → < of
the sum of rates across all available paths. This function Γ can
take different forms depending on the scenario under study,
like the square root [31] or a capacity form. In addition to the
transmission rate, we include the relay nodes’ battery level in
each player’s utility, weighted by some positive parameter α.
The combination of these two objectives can be understood
as the player aiming to maximize its total transmission rate,
while saving the batteries of the relays.
There is some capacity constraint of the maximum aggre-
gated rate at every relay and destination node. Let cmax ∈ <L
denote the vector with maximum capacities, where L is the
number of relays plus destination nodes. Let M = [mla]
denote the L×A matrix that define the aggregated flows for
each relay and destination node, such that element mla = 1, if
flow node a is aggregated in node l, and mla = 0 otherwise.
The dynamic network flow control game is given by the
following set of coupled OCP:
G4 :
∀i ∈ Q
maximize
{uit}∈
∏∞
t=0 Ui
∞∑
t=0
βt
Γ
 Ai∑
a=1
uiat
+ α S∑
k=1
xkt

s.t. xkt+1 = x
k
t − δ
Q∑
i=1
∑
uia∈Fk
uiat
xk0 = B
k
max, 0 ≤ xkt ≤ Bkmax
Mut ≤ cmax, uiat ≥ 0
k = 1, . . . , S, a = 1, . . . , Ai
(61)
Note that each player’s utility can be expressed in separable
form:
pii(xit,u, t) , Γ
 Ai∑
a=1
uiat
+ α S∑
k=1
xkt
=
∑
i∈Q
Γ
 Ai∑
a=1
uiat
+ α S∑
k=1
xkt −
∑
j∈Q:j 6=i
Γ
 Aj∑
a=1
ujat

(62)
Therefore, Lemma 3 establishes that problem (61) is a DPG,
with potential function given by:
Π(xt,ut, t) =
∑
i∈Q
Γ
 Ai∑
a=1
uiat
+ α S∑
k=1
xkt (63)
Before applying Theorem 1, we have to check whether
Assumptions 1–4 are satisfied. We follow [31] and choose
Γ(·) , √(+ ·) (where  > 0 is only added to avoid
differentiability issues when uiat = 0). Let X and U i be
open convex sets containing the Cartesian products of intervals
[0, Bkmax] and [0,∞), respectively. It follows that Assumptions
1–2 hold. Moreover, since Γ is concave and problem (61) has
linear equality constraints and concave inequality constraints,
Slater’s condition holds, i.e., Assumption 3 is satisfied. Finally,
since the constraint set in (61) is compact, Lemma 5.1 states
that Assumption 4 holds. Hence, Theorem 1 establishes that
we can find an NE of (61) by solving the following MOCP:
P4 :
maximize
{ut}∈
∏∞
t=0 U
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
i∈Q
Γ
 Ai∑
a=1
uiat
+ α S∑
k=1
xkt

s.t. xkt+1 = x
k
t − δ
∑
i∈Q
∑
uia∈Fk
uiat
xk0 = B
k
max, 0 ≤ xkt ≤ Bkmax
Mut ≤ cmax, ut ≥ 0
k = 1, . . . , S
(64)
B. Finite horizon approximation and simulation results
As opposed to the LQ smart-grid problem, there is not
known closed form solution for problem (64). Thus, we have
to rely on numerical methods to solve the MOCP. Suppose
that we set the weight parameter α in Π low enough to
incentivize some positive transmission. Eventually, the nodes’
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batteries will be depleted, so the system will get stuck in
an equilibrium state, with no further state transitions. Thus,
we can approximate the infinite-horizon problem (64) as a
finite-horizon problem, with horizon bounded by the time-
step at which all batteries have been depleted. Moreover, in
our setting, we have assumed Γ to be concave. Therefore, we
can effectively solve (64) with convex optimization solvers
(we use the software described in [32]). The benefit of using
a convex optimization solver is that standard optimal control
algorithms are computationally demanding when the state and
action spaces are subsets of vector spaces.
For our numerical experiment, we consider Q = 2 players
that share a network of S = 4 relay nodes, organized in two
layers (see Figure 2). In this particular setting, each player is
allowed to use four paths, A1 = A2 = 4. The connectivity
matrix M can be obtained from Figure 2. The battery is
initialized to Bmax = 1 for the four relay nodes, we set the
depleting factor δ = 0.05, discount factor β = 0.9, the weight
α = 1,  = 0.001 and the vector of maximum capacities
cmax = [0.5, 0.15, 0.5, 0.15, 0.4, 0.4]
>.
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Fig. 2. Network scenario for two users and two levels of relying nodes.
Player S1 aims to transmit to destination D1, while S2 aims to transmit to
destination D2. They have to share relay nodes N1, . . . , N4. We denote the
L = 6 aggregated flows as L1, . . . , L6.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the L = 6 aggregated
flows, the A = 8 flows and the battery of each of the
N = 4 relay nodes. Since we have included the battery level
of the relay nodes in the users’ utilities (i.e., α > 0), the
users have an extra incentive to limit their flow rate. Thus,
there are two effective reasons to limit the flow rate: satisfy
the problem constraints and save battery. We can see that
the aggregated flows with higher maximum capacity are not
saturated (L1 < 0.5, L3 < 0.5, L4 < 0.4, and L6 < 0.4).
The reason is that the users have limited their individual flow
rates in order to save relays’ batteries. On the other hand, the
aggregated flows with lower maximum capacity are saturated
(L2 = L4 = 0.15) because the capacity constraint is more
restrictive than the self-limitation incentive. When the batteries
of the nodes with higher maximum capacity (N1, N3) are
depleted (around t = 70), the flows through these nodes
stop. This allows the other flows (u14t , u
24
t ) to transmit at a
higher rate. At this time, the capacity constraint in L2, L4 is
more restrictive than the self-limitation incentive for saving
the batteries, so that the users transmit at the maximum rate
allowed by the capacity constraints (note that L2 = L4 = 0.15
remains constant). When the battery of every node is depleted,
none of the users is allowed to transmit anymore and the
system enters in an equilibrium state.
We remark that the solution obtained is an NE based on
an OL game analysis. Finally, the results shown in Figure 3
have been obtained with a centralized convex optimization
algorithm, meaning that it should be run off-line by the sys-
tem designer, before deploying the real system. Alternatively,
we could have used the distributed algorithms proposed by
reference [33], enabling the players to solve the finite horizon
approximation of problem (64) in a decentralized manner, even
with the coupled capacity constraints.
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Fig. 3. Network flow control with Q = 2 players, S = 4 relay nodes and
A1 = A2 = 4 available paths per node. (Top) Aggregated flow rates at
L1, . . . , L6. (Middle) Flow for each of the A = 8 available paths. (Bottom)
Battery level in each of the S = 4 relay nodes.
VII. DYNAMIC MULTIPLE ACCESS CHANNEL:
NONSEPARABLE UTILITIES
In this section, we consider an uplink scenario in which
every user i ∈ Q independently chooses its transmitter power,
uit, aiming to achieve the maximum rate allowed by the
channel [18]. If multiple users transmit at the same time, they
will interfere each other, which will decrease their rate, so
that they have to find an equilibrium. Let Rit denote the rate
achieved by user i with normalized noise at time t:
Rit , log
(
1 +
∣∣hi∣∣2 uit
1 +
∑
j∈Q:j 6=i |hj |2 ujt
)
(65)
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where hi denotes the fading channel coefficient of user i.
A. Multiple access channel DPG and equivalent MOCP
Let xit ∈
[
0, Bimax
]
denote the battery level for each player
i ∈ Q, which is discharged proportionally to the transmitted
power uit. The state of the system is given by the vector with
all individual battery levels: xt =
(
xit
)
i∈Q ∈ X . Thus, each
player is only affected by its own battery, such that S = Q,
X (i) = {i} and xit = xit. Suppose the agents aim to maximize
its transmission rate, while also saving their battery. This
scenario yields the following dynamic game:
G5 :
∀i ∈ Q
maximize
{uit}∈
∏∞
t=0 Ui
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Rit + αx
i
t
)
s.t. xit+1 = x
i
t − δuit, xi0 = Bimax
0 ≤ uit ≤ P imax, 0 ≤ xit ≤ Bimax
(66)
where α is the weight given for saving the battery, δ is the
discharging factor, and P imax and B
i
max denote the maximum
transmitter power and maximum available battery level for
node i, respectively. Problem (66) is a dynamic infinite-horizon
extension of the static problem proposed in [34].
Instead of looking for a separable structure in the players’
utilities, we show that Lemma 4 holds and, hence, problem
(66) is a DPG:
∂2pii(xit,ut, t)
∂xit∂u
j
t
=
∂2pij(xit,ut, t)
∂xjt∂u
i
t
= 0 (67)
∂2pii(xit,ut, t)
∂xit∂x
j
t
=
∂2pij(xit,ut, t)
∂xjt∂x
i
t
= 0 (68)
∂2pii(xit,ut, t)
∂uit∂u
j
t
=
∂2pij(xit,ut, t)
∂ujt∂u
i
t
=
− ∣∣hi∣∣2 ∣∣hj∣∣2(
1 +
∑
p∈Q |hp|2 upt
)2
(69)
In order to find an equivalent MOCP, let us define X i and U i as
open convex sets containing the closed intervals
[
0, Bimax
]
and
[0, P imax], respectively, so that Assumptions 1–2 hold. Derive
the potential function from (23):
Π(xt,ut, t) = log
(
1 +
Q∑
i=1
|hi|2uit
)
+ α
Q∑
i=1
xit (70)
Since (70) is concave and all equality and inequality con-
straints in (66) are linear, Assumption 3 is satisfied through
Slater’s condition. Moreover, since the constraint set is com-
pact and the potential is continuous, Lemma 5.1 establishes
that Assumption 4 holds. Therefore, Theorem (1) states that
we can find an NE of (66) by solving the following MOCP:
P5 :
maximize
{ut}∈
∏∞
t=0 U
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log
(
1 +
Q∑
i=1
|hi|2uit
)
+ α
Q∑
i=1
xit
)
s.t. xit+1 = x
i
t − δuit, xi0 = Bimax
0 ≤ uit ≤ P imax, 0 ≤ xit ≤ Bimax
∀i ∈ Q
(71)
B. Simulation results
Similar to Sec. VI-B, the system reaches an equilibrium
state when the batteries have been depleted. Thus, the solution
can be approximated by solving a finite horizon problem.
Moreover, since the problem is concave, we can use convex
optimization software, like [32]. Alternatively, we could solve
the KKT system with an efficient ad-hoc distributed algorithm,
like in [18].
We simulated an scenario with Q = 4 users. We set the
maximum battery level Bimax = 33 for all users, the maximum
power allowed per user P imax = 5 for all users, the weight
battery utility factor α = 0.001, the transmitter power battery
depletion factor δ = 1, and the discount factor β = 0.95. The
channel gains are |h1| = 2.019. |h2| = 1.002 |h3| = 0.514,
and |h4| = 0.308.
Figure 4 shows appealing results: the solution of the
MOCP—which is an NE of the game—is actually a sched-
ule. In other words, instead of creating interference among
users, they wait until the users with higher channel-gain have
depleted their batteries.
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Fig. 4. Dynamic multiple access scenario with Q = 4 users. (Top)
Sequence of transmitter power chosen by every user. (Bottom) Evolution of
the transmission rates.
VIII. OPTIMAL SCHEDULING: NONSTATIONARY PROBLEM
WITH DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING SOLUTION
In this section we present the most general form of the pro-
posed framework, and show its applicability to two scheduling
problems. First, one of the games has nonseparable utilities, so
we have to verify second order conditions (17)–(19). Second,
neither the equivalent MOCP can be approximated by a finite
horizon problem, nor the utilities are concave. Thus, we cannot
rely upon convex optimization software and we have to use
optimal control methods, like dynamic programming [23].
Finally, we consider a nonstationary scenario, in which the
channel coefficients evolve with time. This makes the state-
transition equations (and the utility for the equal rate problem)
depend not only on the current state, but also on time. This
problem was introduced in the preliminary paper [19].
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A. Proportional fair and equal rate scheduling games and
their equivalent MOCP
Let us redefine the rate achieved by user i at time t, so that
we consider nonstationary channel coefficients:
Rit , log
1 + ∣∣hit∣∣2 uit
1 +
∑
j∈Q:j 6=i
∣∣∣hjt ∣∣∣2 ujt
 (72)
where uit is the transmitter power of player i, and |hit| is its
time-varying channel coefficient.
We propose two different scheduling games, namely, pro-
portional fair and equal rate scheduling.
1) Proportional fair scheduling: Proportional fair is a
compromise-based scheduling algorithm. It aims to maintain a
balance between two competing interests: trying to maximize
total throughput while, at the same time, guaranteeing a
minimal level of service for all users [35]–[37].
In order to achieve this tradeoff, we propose the following
game:
G6 :
∀i ∈ Q
maximize
{uit}∈
∏∞
t=0 Ui
∞∑
t=0
βtxit
s.t. xit+1 =
(
1− 1
t
)
xit +
Rit
t
xi0 = 0, 0 ≤ uit ≤ P imax
(73)
where the state of the system is the vector of all players’ aver-
age rates xt =
(
xit
)
i∈Q. Since each player aims to maximize
its own average rate, the state-components are unshared among
players: S = Q and X (i) = {i}.
In order to show that problem (73) is a DPG, we evaluate
Lemma 3 with positive result, and obtain Π from (16):
Π(xt,ut, t) =
Q∑
i=1
xit (74)
Now, we show that we can derive an equivalent MOCP. It is
clear that Assumptions 1–2 hold. By taking the gradient of the
constraints of (73) and building a matrix with the gradients
of the constraints (i.e., the gradient of each constraint is a
column of this matrix), it is straightforward to show that the
matrix is full rank. Hence, the linear independence constraint
qualification holds (see, e.g., [20, Sec. 3.3.5], [21]), meaning
that Assumption 3 is satisfied. Finally, since Rit ≥ 0 and xi0 =
0, we conclude that there exists some scalar M ≥ 0 such that
the level set {xt|
∑
i∈Q x
i
t ≥ M} is nonempty and bounded,
so that Lemma 5.3 establishes that Assumption 4 is satisfied.
Thus, from Theorem 1, we can find an NE of DPG (73) by
solving the following MOCP:
P6 :
maximize
{ut}∈
∏∞
t=0 U
∞∑
t=0
βt
Q∑
i=1
xit
s.t. xit+1 =
(
1− 1
t
)
xit +
Rit
t
xi0 = 0, 0 ≤ uit ≤ P imax
(75)
2) Equal rate scheduling: In this problem, the aim of each
user is to maximize its rate, while at the same time keeping the
users’ cumulative rates as close as possible. Let xit denote the
cumulative rate of user i. The state of the system is the vector
of all users’ cumulative rate xt =
(
xit
)
i∈Q. Again S = Q andX (i) = {i}. This problem is modeled by the following game:
G7 :
∀i ∈ Q
maximize
{uit}∈
∏∞
t=0 Ui
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(1− α)Rit
− α
∑
j∈Q:j 6=i
(
xit − xjt
)2)
s.t. xit+1 = x
i
t +R
i
t
xi0 = 0, 0 ≤ uit ≤ P imax
(76)
where parameter α weights the contribution of both terms.
It is easy to verify that conditions (17)–(19) are satisfied.
Hence, from Lemma 4, we know that problem (76) is a DPG.
In order to obtain an equivalent MOCP, let us define X i
and U i as open convex sets that contain the intervals [0,∞)
and [0, P imax], respectively. It follows that Assumptions 1–2
hold. Similar to the proportional fair scheduling problem (73),
Assumption 3 holds through the linear independence constraint
qualification. Finally, let us check Assumption 4 as follows.
Derive the potential Π by integrating (23):
Π(xt,ut, t) = (1− α) log
(
1 +
Q∑
i=1
|hit|2uit
)
− α
Q−1∑
i=1
Q∑
j=i+1
(
xit − xjt
)2
(77)
We distinguish two extreme cases: i) all players have exactly
the same rate (i.e., xit = x
j
t , i, j = 1, . . . , Q); and ii) each
player’s rate is different from any other player’s rate (i.e.,
xit 6= xjt , i 6= j). When all players have exactly the same rate,
the terms (xit − xjt )2 vanish for all (i, j) pairs, and (77) only
depends on the actions (the state becomes irrelevant). Since
the action constraint set is compact, existence of solution is
guaranteed by Lemma 5.1. When each player’s rate is different
from any other player’s rate, the term −(xit−xjt )2 is coercive,
so that (77) becomes coercive too (since the constraint action
set is compact, the term depending on uit is bounded). Thus,
existence of optimal solution is guaranteed by Lemma 5.2.
Finally, the case where some player’s rate are equal and
some are different is a combination of the two cases already
mentioned. so that the equal terms vanish and the different
terms make (77) coercive. Hence, Theorem 1 states that we
can find an NE of DPG (76) by solving the following MOCP:
P7 :
maximize
{ut}∈
∏∞
t=0 U
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(1− α) log
(
1 +
Q∑
i=1
|hit|2uit
)
− α
Q−1∑
i=1
Q∑
j=i+1
(
xit − xjt
)2)
s.t. xit+1 = x
i
t +R
i
t, x
i
0 = 0
0 ≤ uit ≤ P imax
(78)
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B. Solving the MOCP with dynamic programming and simu-
lation results
Although Lemma 5 establishes existence of optimal solution
to these MOCP, these problems are nonconcave and cannot be
approximated by finite horizon problems. Thus, we cannot rely
on efficient convex optimization software. In order to numeri-
cally solve these problems, we can use dynamic programming
methods [23].
Standard dynamic programming methods assume that the
MOCP is stationary. One standard method to cope with
nonstationary MOCP is to augment the state space so that it
includes the time as an extra dimension for some time length
T . Let the augmented state-vector at time t be denoted by x˜t =
(xt, t) ∈ X˜ , X×{0, . . . , T}. The state-transition equation in
the augmented state space becomes f˜ : X˜ ×U → X˜ . Since we
are tackling an infinite horizon problem, when augmenting the
state space with the time dimension, it is convenient to impose
a periodic time variation:
f˜(x˜t,ut) ,
[
f(xt,ut, t)
t+ 1 (if t < T ) or 0 (if t = T )
]
(79)
Otherwise, it could be difficult to apply computational dy-
namic programming methods.
One further difficulty for solving MOCP with continuous
state and action spaces is that dynamic programming meth-
ods are mainly derived for discrete state-action spaces. Two
common approaches to overcome this limitation are i) to
use a parametric approximation of the value function (e.g.,
consider a neural network with inputs the continuous state
action variables that is trained by minimizing the error in the
Bellman equation); or ii) to discretize the continuous spaces,
so the value function is approximated in a set of points. For
simplicity, we follow the discretization approach here. We
remark that it may be problematic to finely discretize the state-
action spaces in high-dimensional problems though, since the
computational load increases exponentially with the number
of states. These and other approximation techniques, usually
known as approximate dynamic programming, are still an
active area of research (see, e.g., [23, Ch. 6], [38]).
Introduce the optimal value function for the augmented set:
V ?(x˜0) , max{ut}∈∏∞t=0 U
∞∑
t=0
βtΠ(x˜t,ut, t)
=
∞∑
t=0
βtΠ(x˜t, φ
?(xt, t), t)
=
∞∑
t=0
βtΠ(x˜t,u
?
t , t) (80)
where φ? : X˜ → U is the optimal policy that provides the
sequence of actions {u?t , φ?(x˜t)}∞t=0 that is the solution
to the MOCP, as explained by Lemma 5. Then, the Bellman
optimality equation is given by
V ?(x˜t) = Π(x˜t,u
?
t ) + βV
?(f˜(x˜t,u
?
t )) (81)
Among the available dynamic programming methods, we
choose value iteration (VI) for its reduced complexity per
iteration with respect to policy iteration (PI), which is es-
pecially relevant when the state-grid has fine resolution (i.e.,
large number of states). VI is obtained by turning the Bellman
optimality equation (81) into an update rule, so that it gener-
ates a sequence of value functions V k that converge to the
optimal value (i.e., limk→∞ V k = V ?, where V0 is arbitrary).
In particular, at every iteration k, we obtain the policy φ that
maximizes V k (policy improvement). Then, we update the
value function V k+1 for the latest policy (policy evaluation).
VI is summarized in Algorithm 1, where the operator dx˜e
denotes the closest point to x˜ in the discrete grid.
Algorithm 1: Value Iteration for the non-stationary MOCP
Inputs: number of states S, threshold 
Discretize the augmented space X˜ into a grid of S states
Initialize ∆ =∞, k = 0 and V0(x˜s) = 0 for s = 1 . . . S
while ∆ > 
for every state s = 1 to S do
x˜s ← the s-th point on the grid
φ(x˜s) = arg maxu Π(x˜s,u) + βVk(df˜ (x˜s,u)e)
Vk+1(x˜s) = Π(x˜s, φ(x˜s)) + βVk(df˜ (x˜s, φ(x˜s)e))
end for
k = k + 1
∆ = maxs |Vk+1(x˜s))− Vk(x˜s))|
end while
Return: φ(x˜s) and Vk+1(x˜s) for s = 1, . . . , S
Note that the output of the value iteration algorithm is a
policy (i.e., a function), rather than a sequence of actions. This
result allows to compute the optimal actions of every player
from the current state at every time-step of the game. When
there is no reason to propose a finite-horizon approximation
of the game, a policy is a more practical representation of the
solution than an infinite sequence of actions.
We simulate a simple scenario with Q = 2 users. The
channel coefficients are sinusoids with different frequency and
different amplitude for each user (see Fig. 5). The maximum
transmitter power is P 1max = P
2
max = 5, with 20 possible
power levels per user, which amounts to 400 possible actions.
We discretize the state-space (i.e., the users’ rates) into a grid
of 30 points per user. The nonstationarity of the environment
is surmounted by augmenting the state-space with T = 20
time steps. Hence, the augmented state space has a total of
302 × 20 = 18.000 states. For the equal-rate problem, the
utility function uses α = 0.9.
The solution of the proportional fair game leads to an
efficient scheduler (see Figure 6), in which both users try to
minimize interference so that they approach their respective
maximum rates.
For the equal rate problem, we observe that the agents
achieve much lower rate, but very similar between them (see
Figure 7). The trend is that the user with a channel with less
gain (User 2, red-dashed line) tries to achieve its maximum
rate, while the user with higher gain channel (User 1, blue-
continuous line) reduces its transmitter power to match the
rate of the other user. In other words, the user with poorest
channel sets a bottleneck for the other user.
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Fig. 5. Periodic time variation of the channel coefficients |hit|2 for Q = 2
users. All possible combination of coefficients are included in a window of
T = 20 time steps.
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Fig. 6. Proportional fair scheduling problem for Q = 2 users. (Top)
Transmitter power uit. (Bottom) Average rate x
i
t given by (73). Both users
achieve near maximum average rates for their channel coefficients |hit|2.
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Fig. 7. Equal rate problem for Q = 2 users. (Top) Transmitter power uit.
(Bottom) Average rate xit/t (recall that x
i
t given by (76) denotes accumulated
rate). User 1 reduces its average rate to match that of User 2, regardless of
having higher channel coefficient.
Finally, note that Algorithm 1 is centralized, such that the
results displayed in Figures 6–7 have been obtained assum-
ing the existence of a central unit that knows the channel
coefficients, transmission power and average rate for all users,
so that it can update the value and policy functions for all
states. We remark that the design and analysis of distributed
dynamic programming algorithms when multiple players share
state-vector components and/or have coupled constraints is a
nontrivial task. Nevertheless, when the players share no state-
vector components and they have uncoupled constraints, there
are distributed implementations of VI and PI that converge
to the optimal solution [39]–[42]. This is indeed the case for
problems (75) and (78), where each agent i has a unique state-
vector component xit and the constraints are uncoupled. There-
fore, the agents could solve these problems in a decentralized
manner.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
DPG provide a useful framework for competitive multia-
gent applications under time-varying environments. On one
hand, DPG allows nonstationary scenarios, thus, more realistic
models. On the other hand, the analysis and solution of DPG
is affordable through an equivalent MOCP. We presented a
complete description of DPG and provided conditions for a
dynamic game with constrained state and action sets to be
of the potential type. To the best of our knowledge, previous
works have not dealt with DPG with constraints explicitly.
We also introduced a range of communication and network-
ing examples: energy demand control in a smart-grid network,
network flow with relays that have bounded link capacity and
limited battery life, multiple access communication in which
users have to optimize the use of their batteries, and two
optimal scheduling games with nonstationary channels. Al-
though these problems have different features each—including
utilities in separable and nonseparable form, convex and non-
convex objectives, closed-form and numerical solutions, and
solution methods based on convex optimization and dynamic
programming algorithms—the proposed framework allowed us
to analyze and solve them in a unified manner.
The DPG framework is promising in the sense that, once
the equivalent MOCP has been formulated, it is possible to use
ideas from optimal control theory to extend the current analy-
sis. In particular, we have assumed that the agents can observe
all the variables that influence their objective functions and
constraints. This is known as perfect information. Although
perfect information is reasonable in many applications, there
are problems in which all the information is not available to
all agents. An example of games with imperfect information
is when the agents cannot directly observe the variables that
influence their objective and constraints; rather, they only
have access to another variable that depends on the state.
The current framework could possibly be extended to this
case by using a partially-observable-Markov-decision-process
(POMDP) formulation [43], [44]. Nevertheless, other forms
of imperfect information—like when the agents cannot see
other players’ actions—would require further study. Another
possible direction to extend the current analysis is to allow
stochastic state transitions and utilities (i.e., considering xt+1
and pii random variables). This can be done by applying the
Euler equation to the stochastic Lagrangian in order to derive
a set of stochastic optimality conditions. Finally, we could
also consider the case where the agents know nothing about
the problem; rather, they have to learn the optimal policy
from trial-and-error experimentation. To this end, we could
apply reinforcement learning (RL) and approximate dynamic
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programming (APD) techniques (such as Q-learning) [45]–
[47], [23, Ch. 6]. The main difficulty with standard APD/RL
techniques is that they have been developed for unconstrained
MOCP, and some adaptation of these techniques is necessary.
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